













I am very happy to have this opportunity to reminisce about my experiences with Gustav Bergmann.  Due to a series of events that I will recount before I conclude this talk, I did not go to GB’s memorial service the year after he died.  For that reason having the occasion, on GB’s 100th birthday, to talk about what he meant to me as a teacher, mentor, scholar and dare I say, father figure, is extremely welcome.  In February 1964, at the age of 18, I arrived in Iowa City from the Bronx, via the Village.  I received my BA with honors in philosophy in 1967, spent one year at Ohio State (because Hochberg, Alan Hausman and Turnbull were there), returned to Iowa from 1968 through 1972 and then started my teaching career at the University of Michigan-Flint.  At the end of my first year at UM-Flint, I returned to Iowa to complete my dissertation, and it got done in no small measure due to Bergmann’s determination to help me get it done.  Of that more later.  I want to start at the beginning of my education at Iowa and talk not only about Bergmann, but also about some of my experiences with other teachers while I was at Iowa.
	I came to Iowa knowing that I wanted to be a philosophy major.  I assumed that philosophy and religion went together and for that reason I should take courses in religion as well as philosophy.  With that mindset I went up to the field house to register. I walked up to the philosophy table and after saying that I wanted to major in philosophy, I asked the faculty member there, somewhat hesitantly: “I guess I ought to take a course in religion?”  Laird was the faculty member and responded: “Why would you want to do that?”  He explained to me why there is no reason to take courses in religion if you are majoring in philosophy.  Upon reflection I now view that experience as my first lesson at Iowa in learning to be wrong, and in how to develop a thick skin.  Being a student at Iowa in the 60’s and early 70’s those were, I found, valuable lessons indeed.
	My first experience with Bergmann as a teacher was in the second semester of my sophomore year.  I was a student in his baby (undergraduate) philosophy of science course.  It was a great course, and there was one particular experience that stands out in my mind (even though it occurred over 40 years ago).  He had completed his discussion of scientific determinism when he started to get excited.  He started to raise his voice and then he literally yelled that there is absolutely no incompatibility between freedom and determinism.  I had never before experienced a professor screaming in the classroom, and it was inspiring to see someone so passionate about an abstract philosophical idea, and it was also somewhat frightening.  I certainly wouldn’t want him yelling at me like that!  Yet during that semester I also saw a kinder and gentler side.
	Iowa City had an arts movie theatre—the Iowa theatre—where foreign films were frequently shown.  I was standing in line waiting to see an Ingmar Bergmann flick, and I was on crutches, due to a foot injury.  GB and Leola were also in line, and he must have recognized me as one of his students for he inquired with some concern about my injury, and mentioned it to Leola.  His interest meant a lot to me then, and I still recall it now.
	Perhaps this is a good place to mention a story about Bergmann that I recently heard from James Van Cleve, who did his undergraduate work at Iowa roughly at the same time as I.  He had taken GB’s undergraduate philosophy of science course and in his senior year he registered for GB’s more advanced History and Systems of Psychology.  Van Cleve recounted how on the first day Bergmann asked if there were any undergraduates in the class.  Those who raised their hands were asked to stand up.  Once they stood up he said to them, “OK you can leave now.”
	I did not have any direct contact or communication with GB for the remainder of my undergraduate education, but his presence was palpable.  Through my courses with Laird, Phil, Robert Baker (with whom I did my honors thesis on G.E. Moore and the problem of other minds) and Ed  (whose seminar on perception I sat in on during the summer when I graduated) I became keenly interested in ontology in general and Bergmann’s ontology in particular.  I remember after the end of my sophomore year going to Berkeley, CA for the summer packing one philosophy book, namely, Essays in Ontology.1  I also remember, in my senior year, there being quite a bit of animosity between Ed and GB as Ed came to reject the basic tenets of Bergmann’s philosophy.  
The policy at Iowa at the time was to have undergraduate philosophy majors who wanted to pursue graduate work in ontology spend at least their first year of graduate school away from Iowa.  I was one such student.  With Herb and Alan at Ohio State I thought I would still feel at home, philosophically speaking, in Columbus.  With Herb I studied contemporary philosophy, Russell, and universals and particulars, and with Alan, Descartes.  When they left so did I.
	During my first semester back at Iowa I took Bergmann’s seminar on math logic devoted to the Liar Paradox.  It was the second semester of a two semester course on math logic and every class I was completely blown away.  Thank heavens for my good friend and fellow graduate student Silvano Miracchi whose notes saved all of us.  That semester I also took a course, taught by Laird, on the philosophy of time, in which I had to give a report on a selection from Richard Gale’s anthology The Philosophy of Time by C.D. Broad titled, “Ostensible Temporality.” 2  My keen interest in the philosophy of time has continued virtually unabated since then.  There are two beliefs that Bergmann asserted that come to my mind here:  He often said that we each stand on someone else’s shoulders and that great philosophers always go back to the same fundamental problems.  I certainly do not view myself as a great philosopher, but I have continually returned to issues surrounding the philosophy of time (and I am indebted to my former teachers).
	Early on, my second or third graduate semester, GB gave a seminar on C.D. Broad’s The Mind and its Place in Nature.3 This was a particularly important course for me.  It was my first opportunity to present a paper before GB, and I worked very hard to do a good job, and make a good impression.  The room in which the seminar was held had an oval table with the students and GB sitting around it.  I began to give my presentation and I could see that GB was pleased.  He seemed to be agreeing with what I was saying and was nodding and smiling as I read on.  Then, much to my startled amazement, he got up on the table and laid down on it, resting his elbow on the table with his hand holding up his head rather like a pin-up girl.  He looked at me with such (philosophical) delight (if there is such a thing) that I probably started to blush.  When I was finished he looked at me and said that there was a dissertation in Broad.  (Leave no stone unturned, I thought, reflecting on the dissertations of several of his former students.)  Since I was still a year or two away from my comprehensive examinations I certainly wasn’t thinking about my dissertation, but at that moment it was clear to me that I would be doing my dissertation with GB!  
	Due to my interest in the philosophy of time, and the influence of McTaggart on Broad I asked GB if we could meet to discuss McTaggart’s The Nature of Existence.4  He agreed, and we decided to meet on Saturday mornings for a couple of hours. I had an experience during one of those Saturday’s that is memorable, but first let me set the stage for it.  Our meetings generally took the following form.  Starting from the beginning of McTaggart’s book, I would come in with something to say about what I had read and then pick out a passage that was unclear to me, or one that I thought was particularly rich and ripe for analysis.  Bergmann listened to what I had to say, and he would read the passage I had picked out, and then the fun would begin.  GB liked to write as he thought through arguments.  So he would construct arguments by scribbling them on a piece of paper, and it was left to me to reconstruct them after our session.  He would be going on and I would blurt out a question or make a comment—needless to say, it was not very easy to get a word in edgewise—and that would generally excite him more.  I in turn fed off of his energy and was able to follow him just enough to keep the dialogue going.  Sometimes he got mad and yelled at me, but he quickly made it clear that he wasn’t really angry at me and, in any case, my skin had thickened enough to easily endure it.  At other times I knew that he was pleased with our talks.  One occasion particularly stands out in that regard.
	I do not remember what the topic was, but we were both having a good time.  He was exhibiting his brilliance and I with a question or comment led him to even greater heights.  And so it went, back and forth until finally GB jumped up in his chair slammed his fist on the table, bent his neck forward and put his face next to mine and said, as only he could (or would!), “Nate we fuck so well together!!!”  What does one say to that?  I confess I do not remember what I said at that point, but I will never forget what he said.  Another time, after an ongoing interchange he said to me “enough foreplay.”
Working on my dissertation with GB was also quite an experience.  I left Iowa in the fall of 1972 to begin my professional career at the University of Michigan-Flint where I still teach.  Naturally, I missed Iowa and saw how difficult it was for my colleagues to complete their dissertation while they were teaching, so I decided to go back to Iowa during the summer after my first year teaching, and GB strongly supported that decision.    At the time my wife Linda was pursuing a Masters in Library Science (after having completed her MA in Philosophy at Iowa 5 years earlier), so I left for Iowa City by myself.  When I arrived I had one chapter—the first—on propositions and time, in hand.  I gave it to GB and he read it quickly and was very pleased.  He said to me that if the other chapters were like this one then there would be no difficulty in completing the dissertation.  Unfortunately, things didn’t go as smoothly for the remaining chapters, which were yet to be written.
I gave GB my second chapter which he gave back to me with copious comments and said we needed to talk about the material.  For the remainder of the summer working with him went more or less as follows.  I would go to his office and we would discuss the chapter in Broad that I was going to be writing on.  We would go through the arguments and, as I mentioned earlier, he wrote as he thought.  I would then start working on the notes he wrote, my recollections of the discussion, and the text.  I then rewrote the second chapter and gave it to him. He would return it to me usually the next day with very extensive comments.  If he thought that I still didn’t get it right, then he would call me back into his office and we would go through the text once more.  
 I had heard stories about professors (not at Iowa of course!), who held on to chapters for weeks on end, or were on sabbatical and couldn’t read chapters until they returned, etc. etc.  My experience was quite the opposite.  I had the impression that GB was in his office waiting for me to give him something to read.  And then as soon as I gave him something to read, he would read it.  I remember one occasion, working on the next to the last chapter on Introspection.  It was a complicated chapter and I was having a hard time with it.  We had discussed the material and I wrote up the chapter.  I turned it in and he didn’t like it.  So we talked again, and again he didn’t like it.  So I rewrote it for a third time.  I gave him the chapter and waited in an office down the hall while he read it.  An hour or so later and he came from his office to mine and stood at the door and handed it to me and shook his head, alas, side to side and not up and down.  I will never forget how I felt, but somehow got through it.
The last chapter was also noteworthy.  As usual, we met to discuss the structure and content of the chapter and as he talked he wrote down notes of his arguments.  I returned home and began to write the chapter and study his notes when I noticed an error in his reasoning.  For the first and only time I called GB at home, and explained to him the mistake I had taken him to make.  He listed attentively.  He accepted my criticism and was proud of me for offering it.  When I was finished he said to me, “Nate, you have become a philosopher.”  He was so excited that the next day when he saw me in the hallway while he was talking to Butch he called me over and recounted to Butch our conversation the day before, and how I was now a philosopher.
With Bergmann’s determination to get my dissertation finished, my determination to finish it and Linda’s patience to type and retype it (Linda was making mistakes and had to retype several times as she was watching the Watergate hearings at the same time), I completed the dissertation by the end of the summer.  In October I returned to Iowa for my oral defense.  These are difficult memories since I think of myself as a strong-willed person but Bergmann is such a domineering person.  At my defense I was hardly able to get a word in edgewise.  Whenever a criticism was directed toward me he would answer before I could.  I recall that one time during the orals I got so angry that I interrupted him and said that I wanted to answer the question.
I recall one occasion during that summer when GB invited Linda and I to his home for dinner.  I think it was then that I first had an opportunity to meet and get to know Leola.  Linda and I must’ve been rather shy on that occasion since shortly after that I recall GB asking me if Linda and I ever talked!
Once I returned to Michigan I corresponded with GB on a fairly regular basis.  (I have several short letters he wrote to me that I am going to give to submit for the archives.)  I would share with him my good fortune at Michigan professionally and he would promptly reply with pleasure.  I would send him my papers for comment and I would ask for his advice on other professional matters.  He was always very supportive.  In 1976, I sent him a paper that I was going to submit to the APA, and wanted his opinion of it before I did so.  He wrote:
Dear Nate
Thank you for sending me your papers.  Since your main purpose, I take it, was, quite property, to make sure that there is nothing “untoward” in the one you want to submit to [the] APA, I read it immediately.  
There is nothing wrong with it.  Nothing at all.  So go ahead [and submit it].  And, I am delighted to say, it is very, nicely written.  Very nicely indeed.  There has been a “quantum jump” in your expository skill, which bodes well for the future.
	Best wishes to both of you.
				GB

 In 1977 I published “Particulars, Positional Qualities and Individuation,” in Philosophy of Science.5  In that paper I argued against Bergmann and Alan Hausman’s claim that bare particulars provide a deeper ontological ground of individuation than positional qualities.  I sent him a copy of the paper and he wrote back:
Dear Nate:
Thank you for sending me your essay.  Pleased as I am that it has been accepted, and pleasantly written as it is, it is yet such that – surprise! – I shall reply.  Since it would no doubt be to our mutual advantage if your piece and mine appeared in the same issue, I would like to submit mine now, at the same time informing the editor that you have permitted me to do so.  Will you give me this permission?  Please let me know.
							Best wishes.
							    GB

He further showed me respect by giving the following title to his reply, “Some Comments on Professor Oaklander’s ‘Particulars, Positional Qualities and Individuation’.”6





Thank you for sending me a copy of the PHILOSOPHIA piece.  I read it with growing pleasure and appreciation.  I think it is very well done and, more importantly, done just the way this sort of thing, i.e., longish reviews, ought to be done, but not always are.  Thus, I am confident, it will help you and help Iowa; nor will it hurt any of those you discuss.
With best wishes to both of you,	
GB

The most significant reminiscence of mine with Bergmann, one that had a profound effect on me, had to do with his reaction to a paper I co-authored with Silvano.  It probably occurred in 1979 or 1980.  The seeds were planted earlier.  My good friend from graduate school, Silvano Mirrachi wrote his dissertation with Laird on negative facts.  Out of his dissertation came a paper he submitted to Philosophy of Science and although it was not accepted for publication, the editors were willing to reconsider.  Silvano dropped out of philosophy to go to law school.  He asked me if I would like to take over the paper and thus co-author it.  I decided to do so; delving into the research on negative facts reading classical papers as well as all of the Iowa ontologists papers on the topic.  As I developed the paper I came to realize that the essence of it was that the idea of an ideal language that is to serve as both a formal representation of a natural language and a metaphysical representation of the world, broke down in the case of negative sentences.  Simply because negation was ineliminable in a logically adequate language, it didn’t follow that negation was a feature of reality.  I recall having a long conversation with Ed at a central division APA in Cincinnati, in the late 70’s where I tried to get him to clarify his disagreement with Bergmann, and explain the main point of his break with GB as reflected in his Philosophical Studies article “Relations: Recreational Remarks.”8 I learned much from those conversations and incorporated some of them into my paper.  It is not my purpose here to defend the thesis that there are no negative facts, but to point out how it influenced my future relationship with GB.  
In 1980 I published, “Russell, Negative Facts and Ontology,” (with S. Miracchi), in Philosophy of Science.9 I do not remember if I sent a typescript or a reprint of the article, and I no longer have the letter he wrote in response to my sending it to him, but I do remember its tenor.  He wrote me that we no longer had anything to talk about or, less stridently, that he had nothing to say to me.  My distinct sense was that since I was strongly going against him he was thereby terminating our relationship.  As you know GB died in 1987 and a year later there was a memorial service in his honor.  Of course I was notified and planned on attending, and clearly everyone thought that I would attend, but when the time came I decided not to go.  I somehow deceived myself into believing that I wasn’t going because I couldn’t get away for work and family reasons, but I came to realize it was my anger at being rejected that made it impossible for me to attend.  Unfortunately, it took me almost 25 years to come to terms with my relationship with GB, and only fairly recently have I come to see that GB was not rejecting me at all.
As the years passed my anger towards GB dissipated.  In 2001 I co-authored an article defending bare particulars against an argument of Michael Loux’s10 and in 2004 I dedicated my book The Ontology of Time11 to the memory of Gustav Bergmann.  I wanted to deliver a copy of it directly to Leola, but it didn’t appear until the end of July and I was not able to get to Iowa City before the end of the summer so I sent her a copy.  I decided to read a paper at the Central States Philosophical Association meetings in Iowa City that year so that I could see Leola.  For me it was also a way of making amends with GB.  Linda and I went to her apartment for dinner.  As soon as we came in and sat down Leola showed me that my book was front and center right next to the three volumes of Bergmann’s writings reprinted by ontos verlag and edited by Erwin Tegtmeier.  We spent the next few hours talking mostly about GB.  I kept on asking Leola questions about GB and she was delighted to answer them.  She took us into her study where I saw a couple of pictures of GB.  It was the first time I had “seen him” in over 30 years and it meant so much for me to do so.  The visit helped me achieve a kind of closure in my relationship with GB, but more was to come.
Before I explain why, I want to recount even now, almost twenty years after he has passed, the impact GB has on me.  As many of you may recall, in 1992, shortly after the posthumous publication of Bergmann’s last book, New Foundations of Ontology, 12 there was a conference at Indiana University to discuss his work.  I attended this conference and met one of the world’s foremost Bergmann scholars, Erwin Tegtmeier, there.  In fall 2001, while I was at Cambridge I heard from Erwin again when he asked me if I would contribute an article on time for Metaphysica.13  We corresponded that fall and then again last year regarding our both attending the Wittgenstein symposium in August of 2005.  We met at the symposium and spent a lot of time together talking ontology.  His colleague Rafael Hüntelmann, editor at ontos offered to publish my next book.  I didn’t give that much thought since I was not working on a book, but then a couple of months later Erwin asked me if my dissertation was my first book, Temporal Becoming and Temporal Relations,14 and I said “no.”  It then occurred to me that I had never published anything from my dissertation or even attempted to.  I told Erwin that my dissertation was on The Ontology of C.D. Broad’s The Mind and Its Place in Nature, and it occurred to me that the editor of ontos verlag might be interested in it.  I decided to send it to Erwin and see what he thought.  As it happens Erwin is an editor of the PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS series at ontos.  He read the manuscript and thought highly of it, but I had reservations.  GB had a heavy hand in the writing of my dissertation and so I was conflicted.  I decided to publish it, as C.D. Broad’s Ontology of Mind, 15 in part as a tribute to GB and also because I have come to make peace with him and this was a further sign of that for me.  
Interestingly, my philosophical work has started to come full circle.  I recently wrote an invited entry on Negative Facts for the Routledge online encyclopedia of philosophy.16   I have been invited to write a paper on temporal states of affairs for Metaphysica, and my work in the philosophy of time has led me to the question of the order of temporal relations.  In my own way, therefore, I think of myself as continuing the legacy of GB.
I am very grateful to GB and my many other teachers at Iowa. GB was very fatherly toward me.  His letters reflect that.  He was also very supportive and encouraging.  I now think that I misunderstood the meaning of his claim “that we have nothing more to talk about.”  In the preparation of this paper I went back to my correspondence and found several short letters from GB.  He always expressed support and fatherly concern.  Certainly, if I was going to reject his method of philosophy then there would be nothing for us to talk about philosophically, but at a personal human level GB was always there for me.  In 1982, two years after my negative facts paper he wrote how pleased he was with my promotion and the completion of my first book.  It was the last letter I received from him, or at least the last that I still possess.  I regret that I did not attend the memorial service one year after his death, but I view this talk as my way of making amends.
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